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Profit Maximization and the Death of God: Theology and Economics in Benedict XVI’s
Charity in Truth
D. Stephen Long
Responses to Benedict XVI’s encyclical on the economy came fast and furious, initiated by George Weigel’s
controversial editorial in the National Review.1 He found parts of the encyclical capitulating to the Peace and Justice
Pontifical Commission established by Pope Paul VI in his 1967 encyclical Populorum Progressio. In response, Weigel
attempted a quest for the historically authentic Benedict by dividing the encyclical between the “gold” written by
Benedict himself and the “red” sponsored by the Peace and Justice Pontifical Commission. For Weigel, the latter was a
capitulation by Benedict not to be taken seriously.
All the usual suspects then rose up to claim either that this posed no significant challenge to the capitalist economic
order or called it decisively into question. Those on the left emphasized Benedict’s “economy of communion,” his
advocacy for government interference, his critique of globalization, and his challenge to letting the free market alone
determine wages. They often neglected the sexual and reproductive issues. Those on the right neglected or dismissed the
language of gift, the “economy of communion,” and the call for government interference, but emphasized the sexual and
reproductive issues, reminding those on the left of Benedict’s affirmation of the 1968 encyclical Humanae Vitae. But
perhaps what both sides missed in this give and take is the profound and particular theological convictions that inform
this encyclical. Instead, we were regularly told that behind this letter is a doctrine of personalism, or a doctrine that
notes the significance of the human person. And this is true, but what is even more important is the Christological
foundation for this anthropology. Unlike other encyclicals on the economy, beginning with Rerum Novarum in 1891 and
following, Benedict’s encyclical is the most thorough theological approach to economic matters in that grand tradition.
He does not prescind from essential Christian teachings in an attempt to make common cause between those in and
outside the Church. He unapologetically establishes a Christological and Trinitarian context for how we should think
about economic exchange.
What makes Benedict XVI such a fascinating pope and theologian is that his exercise of the Church’s teaching office
is, in many ways, the fruit of some profound shifts in Catholic theology in the mid--twentieth century, particularly in
understanding the relation between nature and grace. Benedict, following in the footsteps of theologians like Henri de
Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar, is not enamored with the rigid distinction between nature and grace fostered by
nineteenth--century neoscholasticism and often still shared by neoconservatives and progressives, both of whom seek to
engage in the broader so--called culture wars by thinking of politics and economics fundamentally in terms of the natural
law. That approach emerges from the neoscholastic distinction that assumed the human person had a twofold end, one
found in nature and the other in supernature. Politics and economics were understood primarily in terms of that natural
end. For this reason, the natural law sufficed to direct all people to the natural end that could make them happy. It
allowed the Church to speak to all people of good will without necessarily proclaiming more particularist Christian
convictions, especially the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation and the necessary mediating role of the Church.
Indeed, true happiness was found in the supernatural end, and for that one needed the Church with its mediation of
Word and sacrament, and its teachings about Jesus and the Triune God, but these were not necessary for the natural end,
and therefore only tangentially related to economics and politics. For that the law of nature gives us what we need. This
could easily be translated into an affirmation of the autonomy of reason via the social sciences, whether that meant
Hayek on the right or Marx on the left. But Benedict XVI has repeatedly stated that the natural law has become nothing
but a “blunt instrument,” and that this division rendered Jesus too tangential for Catholic social ethics. He seldom uses
the natural law when he addresses political and economic matters. Instead, he is unabashedly Christological and
Trinitarian in his counsel to Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Jews, secularists, and others.
Benedict does not deny that nature has a “law” or “grammar,” that is to say, an order that God gives to it and that we
can discover.2 This order is what makes “truth” possible, and such an order, as he has repeatedly stated, requires both
truth and charity to be rightly discerned. But truth is for him personal because, following the Gospel of John, Truth is a
Person. I hope to show first how the connection between charity and truth is an inextricably Christological claim.
Christology provides the theological foundations of creaturely existence. I then want to show how this makes
Christianity a factor in economic life — a factor that gets lost in the modern era and must be retrieved. Finally, I
contrast Benedict’s “Christocentric anthropology” (the term comes from Tracey Rowland’s work) with some
contemporary ethicists and economists and discuss what it might demand of us.
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1. Truth and Charity: The Theological Foundation of Existence
Benedict XVI unapologetically claims that Christ’s life establishes the foundation for human existence. It is basic to his
argument in Caritas in Veritate (CV). He writes, “Charity in truth, to which Jesus Christ bore witness by his earthly life
and especially by his death and resurrection, is the principal driving force behind the authentic development of every
person and of all humanity” (CV, no. 1). Read in comparison to Populorum Progressio (PP), on which Caritas in
Veritate comments, this is a startling claim. It stated, “To be authentic, [development] must be well rounded; it must
foster the development of each man and of the whole man” (PP, no. 14).3 Populorum Progressio tended to explain this
development primarily in terms of the human creature’s natural end. All that was necessary was a doctrine of creation.
Therefore, Paul VI wrote, “Just as the whole of creation is ordered toward its Creator, so too the rational creature should
of his own accord direct his life to God, the first truth and the highest good. Thus human self--fulfillment may be said to
sum up our obligations” (PP, no. 16). Note how the “rational creature” here directs himself to God and the good “of his
own accord.” Our obligation is “human self--fulfillment,” and the call for “development” makes no explicit reference to
Jesus, God’s gifts, or even the Triune God. This is not to argue that Paul VI did not think they mattered; of course he
did, but they remained implicit.
Benedict, on the other hand, states explicitly that the “principal driving force behind authentic development” is Jesus.
That, I think, provides the intelligibility to language such as “gift” and “communion” in this letter. It is not some
capitulation to leftist thought, but the theological affirmation that creation takes place in, through, and for Christ.
Benedict’s explicit reference to particular Christian dogmas in comparison to Paul VI’s appeal to a more generic
anthropology also shows the post--Christian and post--secular reality of Western politics and economics in the twenty-first century. It reflects a post--Christian reality in that basic Christian teachings must now be explicitly heralded. We no
longer assume a stable Christian civilization or culture, a patrimony tacitly or otherwise acknowledged, within which
something like an appeal to the “natural law” might be intelligible. It is post--secular in that supposed common universals
within secularism that seemed to make common cause with the natural law, such as Habermas did in his “Dialogue” with
Cardinal Ratzinger, also no longer provide a compelling patrimony. 4 The Church’s role in the world
has changed
markedly since 1967, which in some sense reflects a failure of Catholic social teaching. No one has been listening. The
arguments were set forth in such a way that they actually contributed to secularization. Benedict takes the Church back to its
roots while at the same time reminding us of the Christian patrimony that we neglect to our peril.
Those claiming Benedict speaks for their side in the culture wars too often neglect his “Christocentric anthropology.”
But this has been a consistent emphasis throughout his work. 5 It is important for understanding the place of
“development” in Caritas in Veritate, for “development” can quickly underwrite a secular program where the “dignity
of the human person,” another of the supposed secular universals, suffices for an anthropology. The 1967 Populorum
Progressio lent itself to such an interpretation as did the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes. For all of the good it has
accomplished, the sharp distinction between nature and supernature in some Catholic social teaching contributed to the
secular marginalization of Christian teaching. Without losing that good, Benedict charts a different course.
As early as 1969, Joseph Ratzinger wrote an essay critiquing some implications of the kind of language arising from
Vatican II that marginalized Christology. For instance, he
found Gaudium et Spes “still based on a schematic
representation of nature and the supernatural viewed far too much as merely juxtaposed.” 6 This fostered an anthropology
that still “divided” the doctrine of the human person too much between “philosophy and theology.” He then asked, “why
exactly the reasonable and perfectly free human being described in [Gaudium et Spes’] first article should suddenly be
burdened with the story of Christ.”7 He recognized that the way of arguing for Catholic social ethics marginalized
Christology. “Burdening” anthropology with Christ best characterizes Benedict’s approach to politics and economics. A
clear example of this is his undelivered address, “The Truth Makes Us Good and Goodness Is True.” In 2007
Benedict XVI was invited to present a lecture at La Sapienza University in Rome. Because of student protests against
the pope’s visit in the name of free speech, the lecture was not given, which is more than ironic. Benedict’s lecture was
about the need for universities to have a requisite freedom to seek truth. But a genuine freedom to seek truth should not
police against revelation, against receiving something more than what an immanent philosophical approach alone could
provide. To explain this, Benedict drew on the doctrine of the incarnation to describe how nature and grace, or philosophy
and theology, should relate.
I would say that St. Thomas’s idea of the relationship between philosophy and theology could be expressed in the
Council of Chalcedon’s formula for Christology: Philosophy and theology must relate to each other “without confusion
and without separation.” “Without confusion” means that both of them preserve their proper identity. Philosophy must
truly remain an undertaking of reason in its proper freedom and proper responsibility; it must recognize its limits, and
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precisely in this way also its grandeur and vastness. Theology must continue to draw from the treasury of knowledge
that it did not invent itself, that always surpasses it and that, never being totally exhaustible through reflection, and
precisely because of this, launches thinking. Together with the “without confusion,” the “without separation” is also in
force: Philosophy does not begin again from zero with the subject thinking in isolation, but rather stands in the great
dialogue of historical wisdom, that again and again it both critically and docilely receives and develops; but it must not
close itself off from that which the religions, and the Christian faith in particular, have received and bequeathed on
humanity as an indication of the way. Various things said by theologians in the course of history and also things handed
down in the practice of ecclesial authorities, have been shown to be false by history and today they confuse us. But at
the same time it is true that the history of the saints, the history of the humanism that grew up on the basis of the
Christian faith, demonstrates the truth of this faith in its essential nucleus, thereby making it an example for public
reason.8
Philosophy has an independence from theology. It is an “undertaking” of reason. But it is never “pure.” It does not
begin anew in each generation. Its grandeur arises both from what it can accomplish and from a humble recognition of
its limits. Such limits make it open to receive wisdom both from a historical patrimony and from faith. True reason need
not fear the gift of faith any more than faith spurns reason. The grandeur of reason is found in both what it can
accomplish and in a humble acknowledgment of its limits that makes it open to both “historical wisdom” and “faith.”
This theme of gift, that Weigel appears to have colored in red, is actually a longstanding commitment of Benedict.9
We see this Christological reading of the relation between philosophy and theology, and nature and grace, repeated,
incorporated, and developed in Caritas in Veritate. Benedict writes, “Reason also stands in need of being purified by
faith . . . religion always needs to be purified by reason” (CV, no. 56). Faith and reason, grace and nature, should no
longer be relegated to separate realms. There is a “porosity” between them that will inevitably entail “border--crossing”
despite the academic policing that takes place on the left and the right.10 Faith needs reason. It must engage the best that
philosophy and the sciences offer. But reason also needs faith. It needs that openness to something beyond its own
immanent borders. For this reason, economics cannot proceed as an insular discipline cordoned off from faith, theology,
and metaphysics. The latter represent a necessary openness to history and being that will always be something more
than “human self--fulfillment” through its own natural resources, albeit those natural resources are necessary for the
ongoing “purification” of faith. For this reason Benedict calls for a “new humanistic synthesis” with regard to the
economy that requires “faith, theology, metaphysics and science to come together in a collaborative effort in service to
humanity” (CV, no. 31). Economics must do its work as a “philosophical discipline.” But if it is to do this well, it will
need to be open to something more than rational choice theory, profit maximization, utilitarian calculation, marginalism,
and the like. Faith, theology, and metaphysics must also play a role. This is a profound challenge to the study and
practice of economics that would require an interdisciplinary approach that few secular universities would permit.
If we are to take Benedict’s teaching seriously, then the goal of economic life would be seen primarily as arising
from and returning to the Eucharist. Its goal is, as he puts it, “true communion.” Notice how when he explains what this
is, he relates grace and nature, faith and reason, in an interesting way: “Today humanity appears much more interactive
than in the past: this shared sense of being close to one another must be transformed into true communion. The
development of peoples depends, above all, on a recognition that the human race is a single family working together in
true communion, not simply a group of subjects who live side by side” (CV, no. 53).11 We have the natural reality of our
close proximity and dependence on each other. But this proximity requires “true communion” if we are to have the kind
of development that suits us as the human race. The natural reality of close proximity requires the grace of “true
communion,” if that globalized proximity is to achieve its true end. This requires transformation. What is this
“transformation” into “true communion”?
Again, this language has precedence in Benedict’s earlier work. It is found in his book Jesus of Nazareth, where he
argues that the politics of Christianity is of a “different order of reality.” That work addresses the question of a Christian
politics, which Benedict claims, is found in “every Eucharistic assembly” for it is “a place where the King of peace
reigns in this sense.”12 If we do not have this politics, we cannot offer to the world “charity in truth.” For this reason
Benedict argues, “The Christological (theological) argument and the social argument are inextricably entwined.” 13
Christology defines the social, even the place of the nations. This does not mean God wishes “to abandon the nations to
themselves” for Jesus “has brought the God of Israel to the nations . . . brought the gift of universality.” This could
easily be misunderstood in a Kant-ian trajectory if we lose sight of the claim that for Benedict, this universality is
intimately linked to “communion with Jesus.”14 Communion is the key here. This universality is a theological
catholicity — a common life that exists transnationally, found primarily in the Catholic Church existing across space
and time. Its task is to bring this “communion” to all the nations, and all nations into this communion.
In Caritas in Veritate, Benedict states that for this “communion” we need “new thinking” that is not just concerned
with the “social sciences” but also draws on “metaphysics and theology” for the development of an adequate “category
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of relation” (CV, no. 53). In order to do so, he first draws on the doctrine of the Trinity (CV, no. 54) and then on
marriage (CV, no. 55). These specific Christian teachings do not mean wisdom is not found elsewhere. Benedict
recognizes that “other cultures and religions” also “teach brotherhood and peace.” Those teachings also provide a
direction for an “integral human development” (CV, no. 55) that has as its end “true communion.”
Why then is Benedict’s theological engagement with Populorum Progressio called “Charity in Truth”? Because the
latter is Christ, and creation is in, through, and for him. What then is truth? “Truth is the light that gives meaning and
value to charity. That light is both the light of reason and the light of faith through which the intellect attains to the
natural and supernatural truth of charity: it grasps its meaning as gift, acceptance and communion” (CV, no. 3).

2. The Loss and Retrieval of the “Christian Factor” and Its Concomitant Economic Practices
We lose the central role of truth and charity in economics when “the sole criterion of truth is efficiency and utility.”
Once reason or nature is construed solely in their terms, then “development is automatically denied” (CV, no. 70). This
is no small challenge to economics. On the whole, “pure” economic reason only uses “efficiency and utility” as the
criterion for truth. It has no place for theology, metaphysics, and the goal of true communion. Take, for instance, the
Acton Institute’s Jay Richards. He explains how we are to think about the relation between a business owner and his or
her employees solely in terms of a purely economic reason. He writes, “To a business, employee wages are costs. . . . A
wage is a price on a commodity — labor.”15 Richards then argues that it must not be understood as anything more than
that. If it is, the system will not work. For this reason, we must not have any minimum wage let alone a just wage. This
is of course classic liberalism, which only knows “efficiency and utility” and polices out any theological or
metaphysical uses of reason. As much as the left adopted a secular social science alone in Marxism to explain
economics, so the right adopts Hayek’s or Weber’s analysis without any “transformation” of that rationality by faith and
the goal of “true communion.” How did this secular reasoning cordon off the “Christian factor” from economic
analysis? How can it be retrieved? Benedict’s work gives insight into both.
We can begin to see this with an important claim made in Caritas in Veritate. A properly theological development
gets thwarted when life gets fragmented. This occurs when business gets defined solely by “maximization of profit,”
politics by “consolidation of power,” and science by “findings of research” (CV, no. 71).16 Then life gets trapped in an
immanence that is not open to anything beyond itself. Managers find their only constituency to be shareholders. We lose
theology and metaphysics, and especially the importance of “gift” in our economic analysis. Of course, this poses a
significant challenge to contemporary capitalist arrangements. At least in the United States, corporate law enshrines
profit maximization. The 1919 Supreme Court ruling Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. stated the legal obligation a CEO has is
only to his or her shareholders to maximize profits. Economists and ethicists are in ready supply who defend this
principle. As Elaine Sternberg put it, “business organizations which seek anything but long--term owner value are guilty
not of socialism, but of theft.” 17 Life gets fragmented because managers, owners, shareholders, and others are trained
only to respond to the question of profit. We no longer find economic exchange also to be a response to the
transcendental predicates of being such as beauty, the true, and the good. Nor do we think it is a matter of a response to
God. The natural and theological orders, as well as their mutual relation, get ignored solely for a materialism that finds
that the “real powers” that shape history are “politics and economics” devoid of metaphysics or theology.18
The latter is a reference to Ratzinger’s 1968 Introduction to Christianity, where he took on the privatization of
Christianity and its catastrophic effects for our understanding of the human person. Ratzinger then asked the question
whether God’s irrelevance for everyday life was not something already present in the Christian West. “We all have to
behave now etsi Deus non daretur (as if there were no God).”19 Ratzinger then wrote, “But as Nietzsche describes it,
once the news really reaches people that ‘God is dead’ and they take it to heart, then everything changes. This is
demonstrated today on the one hand, in the way that science treats human life: man is becoming a technological object
while vanishing to an ever greater degree as a human subject, and he has only himself to blame.” 20 The science that
treats the human subject this way includes economics.
In Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger traced this dominance of the technological approach to our understanding
of the human person through a variety of stages, but he primarily traced it through Vico’s variation on an Aristotelian
metaphysical theme. He wrote, “Following formally in Aristotle’s footsteps, [Vico] asserts that real knowledge is the
knowledge of causes. I am familiar with a thing if I know the cause of it; I understand something that has been proved if
I know the proof. But from this old thought something completely new is deduced: If part of real knowledge is the
knowledge of causes, then we can truly know only what we have made ourselves, for it is only ourselves that we are
familiar with.”21 This notion of truth is what traps us in an immanent world of our own making. Vico turns away from
the scholastic “verum est ens” to “verum qui factum” — a move away from truth as a “transcendental predicate of
being” to the true as the made. Truth is what we make. This introduces the “scientific” age, and the dominance of the
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factum, or the fact. The result is a materialism that assumes that the “real powers” that shape history are “politics and
economics.”22 Ratzinger found Latin American liberation theology adopting this materialist assumption through its
primacy of “praxis.” This did allow for some positive movements: Marx’s claim that the point is not to interpret the
world but to change it was a positive influence, but this primacy of praxis meant “God had nothing to do.” 23 That is to
say, even the theologians who were attempting to overcome the privatization of theology did it in such a way that God
did not matter.
If this 1968 book recognized and challenged any immanent, secular basis for Latin American liberation theology’s
social analysis, the 2009 Caritas in Veritate recognizes and combats a similar problem in capitalist economic analysis.
Both materialist analyses should be ruptured by the “gift” of faith. Ratzinger differentiates this understanding of the
relation between theology and philosophy from a philosophy informed by the modern version of “the true is the made.”
He writes, “faith is not something thought up by me but something that comes to me from outside; its words cannot be
treated and exchanged as I please; it is always foreordained, always ahead of my thinking. The positivity of what comes
toward me from outside myself, opening up to me what I cannot give myself, typifies the process of belief or faith.
Therefore, here the foregiven word takes precedence over the thought, so that it is not the thought that creates its own
words but the given word that points the way to the thinking that understands. With this primacy of the word and the
‘positivity’ of belief apparent in it goes the social character of belief, which signifies a second difference from the
essentially individualistic structure of philosophical thinking.” 24 Benedict makes a similar argument in Caritas in
Veritate. The “ultimate source” for “truth and love” is not humanity but God. He writes, “This principle is extremely
important for society and for development, since neither can be a purely human product; the vocation to development on
the part of individuals and peoples is not based simply on human choice but is an intrinsic part of a plan that is prior to
us and constitutes for all of us a duty to be freely accepted. That which is prior to us and constitutes us — subsistent
Love and Truth — shows us what goodness is and in what our true happiness consists. It shows us the road to true
development” (CV, no. 52).

3. Economic Consequences
So what would Benedict’s theological economics require of us? First, it requires that we acknowledge that economics is
never an independent, autonomous exercise. It is always situated in a larger, political, metaphysical, and theological
context. The political context is ruled by the requirements of justice. For this reason, Benedict argues, “The market is
subject to the principles of so--calledcommutative justice, which regulates the relations of giving and receiving between
parties to a transaction. But the social doctrine of the Church has unceasingly highlighted the importance of distributive
justice and social justice for the market economy, not only because the market belongs within a broader social and
political context, but also because of the wider network of relations within which it operates” (CV, no. 35). That larger
context also includes a natural and metaphysical order — truth, beauty, goodness. Citing John Paul II, Benedict writes,
“What is needed is an effective shift in mentality which can lead to the adoption of new lifestyles ‘in which the quest for
truth, beauty, goodness and communion with others for the sake of common growth are the factors which determine
consumer choices, savings and investments’ ” (CV, no. 51, citing Centesimus Annus, no. 36). Finally, it includes a
theological order, one already alluded to in this metaphysical order; it is an order that acknowledges that our being
comes as gift and has its true purpose in communion.
Let me conclude by attempting to place economic analysis in terms of this larger natural, metaphysical, and
theological structure. Think of the natural, metaphysical, and theological not as three discrete, autonomous circles, but
as a single layered reality. We can begin with the “natural” — with our basic animality, its needs and desires. But that
“natural” always opens up to a yet greater reality, a metaphysical one where the unavoidability of goodness, beauty, and
truth gives the natural its shape. Without that metaphysical quest, the natural loses its own basic reality and becomes
nothing but a materialist order defined by technological calculations. But that natural and metaphysical reality is not the
only reality for we are by nature oriented to something yet even greater — to a desire for God. This is a desire that
cannot be satisfied naturally, but seeks something more — the gift of charity and true communion. In order to explain
this I return to the theme of work and ask what is required of us if we think of economic relations in terms of this larger
structure.
Any relation to workers exists first within a natural structure. We have biological needs and desires that must be
fulfilled for “authentic human development,” needs for food, rest, clothing, shelter, health care, security, play, and the
like. We cannot survive without the satisfaction of these basic needs and desires. But what regulates them?
Commutative justice might suggest that legal contracts alone provide proper regulation. If I enter freely into an
economic arrangement and agree to provide or purchase goods and services at market prices, then that is the only
“natural” context that should determine “value.” Catholic social teaching never accepted this. Since Leo XIII’s Rerum
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Novarum it has claimed that market forces alone cannot determine just wages. As Leo XIII put it, “there underlies a
requirement of natural justice higher and older than any bargain voluntarily struck: the wage ought not to be in any way
insufficient for the bodily needs of a temperate and well--behaved worker. If having no alternative and fearing a worse
evil, a workman is forced to accept harder conditions imposed by an employer or contractor, he is the victim of violence
against which justice cries out.”25 Benedict XVI continues this longstanding Catholic teaching when he says that foreign
workers “cannot be considered as a commodity or a mere workforce” (CV, no. 62). The natural order alone cannot be
truly represented by claiming that market value alone constitutes what is “natural,” let alone that the market, as a
“natural” reality, identifies or responds properly to the metaphysical and theological ordering of our basic animality.
I already mentioned Jay Richards’s argument that a purely natural economic reason would treat wages as nothing but
a commodity. But this overlooks the layered reality within which economics takes place. For some reason, theological
voices that defend the “free” market overlook this basic teaching. Take, for instance, the work of William McGurn. He
questions the role of government to legislate against child labor based on the real possibilities afforded an Asian child
who works in a garment factory sewing clothes for Wal--Mart. He by no means defends child labor, but he wants to
make his “American” audience aware of the market realities this child faces. He writes, “An Asian audience would
immediately recognize that the real alternative for that Bangladesh girl would not be trundling off to class but
scavenging through garbage heaps or prostituting herself.” 26 And he concludes, “To our sensibilities, this is not an
attractive trade--off. But in real life poor people typically do not have the choices we wish them to have, and the market
sometimes brings better choices even when that is not its intention. While it might soothe Western consciences to
‘eliminate’ child labor through regulations, in reality we may — if successful — be forcing children into something
worse.”27 What is troubling about this statement is that McGurn claims it is “our sensibilities” that make the option
between child labor and child prostitution an “unattractive trade--off.” But this has nothing to do with “western
consciences”; it is a matter of what justice demands based on the natural human desires that well up in us, pointing us to
their proper ordering that can only be known once we examine metaphysics and theology. To be outraged by such a
reality is to begin to have one’s basic desires properly ordered. To be told that it is a false sensibility is to disorder
desire. If the unregulated free market is recommended because it gives an Asian child a choice between prostitution and
child labor, then it does not have much to recommend it. It is not “natural,” but an unnatural situation that calls for
remedy.
For Benedict, natural justice demands not just commutative justice, but also distributive and social. He writes, “In
fact, if the market is governed solely by the principle of the equivalence in value of exchanged good, it cannot produce
the social cohesion that it requires in order to function well” (CV, no. 35). What would it mean to function well? Not
only distributive and social justice, but also metaphysics and theology will be determinative factors that must be taken
into account if it is to function well. What would this entail? It requires God to be considered in economic exchanges,
for they are always forms of communion that implicate our lives in those of others. Economic exchange is not a bare act
of will two people perform when they trade with each other. It is an act that always presumes something that came prior,
which Benedict identifies as “subsistent Love and Truth” (CV, no. 52). Perhaps the English version capitalizes these
terms for a reason. Subsistent relations are relations among the Triune Persons. The Father shares his essence with the
Son, who is Truth. The Son only is the Son because of his relation to the Father. He “subsists” in the Father. Likewise,
the Father and Son share their common essence with the Spirit, who is Love. The Spirit “subsists” in them. This means
that the Persons are not individual substances who have some autonomous “I” that constitutes their being. They are who
they are because they subsist in another, and they do so immediately.
We are made in and for this “image.” We are not God so our relations do not have the same immediacy as the Triune
Persons, but we are nonetheless implicated in each other’s lives such that without acknowledging that implication we
will fail truly to develop as we should. This order comes before us and we neglect it at our peril. Oliver O’Donovan
nicely explains this when he encourages us not to think in terms of “economic exchange” at all, but to think of these
relations in terms of “communication.” He finds the term “exchange” to be inappropriate as a reference to God’s
relations with creation. He writes, “ ‘Exchange’ imports the idea of closure to a transaction, restoring the parties to the
independence of the status quo ante, each strengthened by the return of value in a different form.” 28 He rightly cautions
against any such contractual use of exchange in theology. “The concept of exchange is not fundamental to community.
It is a device, abstract and formal, created together with the institution of trade, the market. To trade is to effect an
exchange of goods between two otherwise equal and unrelated agents.” 29 Instead, “communication” (from koinonia) is a
more basic theological term. He quotes Althusius, who defines communication as goods held in common such as
“things, services, and common rights (iura), by which the numerous and various needs of each and every symbioate are
supplied, the self--sufficiency and mutuality of life and human society are achieved, and social life is established and
conserved.” Communication is, then, to give anything “meaning” and thus has as its “paradigm object” the word.30
So let us not even use the term “economic exchange.” When I purchase goods and services I am “communicating”;

96

my life becomes a mediated subsistent relation intertwined with others. Purchasing and consuming are more like
language, sharing a meal together, or engaging in sexual intercourse than they are isolated discrete acts that are nothing
but a bare “exchange.” This is why economics, language, and sex are always related, why it is right to be obsessed with
sex — if we are always at the same time obsessed with economics and language. Stanley Hauerwas tells of a Jewish
friend who states, “Any God who will not tell you what to do with your pots and pans and genitals isn’t worth
worshipping.” Sex, language, and economics are all forms of communication that cannot be reduced to bare forms of
exchange without thwarting our humanity. They must all be open to something beyond them if we are to be truly
human. Sex should be open to life, to the gift that comes through procreation. Language makes us open to the gift of
community, for none of us has a private language. Economics opens us to the metaphysical and theological order that
antedates our existence, an existence founded on a generous act of creatio ex nihilo where God creates solely out of the
Love and Truth that defines God’s being. This theory of relations must be present whenever economic calculations are
made.
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